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Voluntary Withdrawals, Forced Resignations, Collective Retirements or Just Bad 
Fortune? A Competing Risks Analysis of Ministerial Turnover in the German Länder 
(1990-2010) 
 












This paper explores the determinants of ministerial duration within the German Länder 
between 1990 and 2010. In arguing that different terminal events ceasing ministerial tenures 
should be analyzed separately, it distinguishes four exit types: voluntary, forced, collective 
(ministers leaving office because their whole party does so) and exits that are neither 
volitional acts of the minister nor politically induced. Depending on the exit type, competing-
risks Cox-models show different effects for one and the same variable on the hazard for 
ministerial turnover. Seniority in high-level politics for example helps not to be forced out of 
office while it has no effect on voluntary or collective exits. Heading an important ministry on 
the other hand increases the chances to rise to other positions in high politics or private 
business, but does not impact the other two hazards. The analysis furthermore shows that the 
principal-agent-logic known from Westminster systems with the prime minister being largely 
sovereign in hiring and firing cabinet members must be adapted to the German context of 
frequent coalition governments. In coalition governments, only ministers from the same party 
as the prime minister exhibit higher hazards for forced exits, while ministers from other 








Introduction: Different Types of Terminal Events for Ministerial Turnover 
 
The tenure of ministers may end because of very different terminal events. Some ministers 
may step down voluntarily because they find other career options more intriguing; others will 
have to leave office because their party was voted out of government; and, others still may be 
forced by the prime minister to leave their ministry because their enmeshment in a scandal 
would otherwise seriously affect the government's popularity. These three examples show that 
ministers face different risks any of which could eventually lead to losing their cabinet post. 
Yet, until now, most scholars of ministerial careers have not distinguished between these 
diverse hazards, but have rather treated all terminal events in the same way. 
     In this article, I follow a different path, distinguishing between twelve specific terminal 
events and showing how often they account empirically for a minister’s demise in cabinets of 
the German Länder. These twelve exit types are enumerated and then aggregated to form four 
broader groups of terminal events: 1) voluntary exits; 2) forced exits; 3) collective exits; and, 
4) exits that are neither volitional acts of the ministers nor politically induced but can be seen 
as terminations due to bad fortune. While the fourth category of technical exits is not of much 
interest from a political science perspective, the three others categories definitely are.1 I 
assume that there are distinctive factors at work for each of the groups influencing the hazards 
of ministerial exit. Using a competing risks approach, these first three exit types are regarded 
as mutually exclusive, yet for every minister at least potentially possible terminal events. In 
the main analysis, I model the different determinants of ministerial turnover according to the 
type of terminal event. 
     I proceed as follows. The next section reviews existing works on executive elites with a 
particular focus on ministerial tenure and puts them in the context of this study. Section three 
explains the distinct hypotheses for the three types of terminal events. I then lay down the 
original dataset used in the statistical models and describe very briefly the specifics of the 
applied competing events hazard model. The results of these Cox models are presented in 
section six. The paper concludes with a short overview of the results and offers some thoughts 
on potential ways to proceed with the topic of ministerial tenure. 
 
This Study in the Context of Existing Works 
 
The majority of scholarship on executive elites can be broadly divided into two groups:  
1. Works that look at the paths into office and thus the probabilities of politicians to gain 
a ministerial seat. In systems with coalition governments, this often means 
investigating the question of how to divide the spoils of offices among the coalition 
partners.2 
 
2. Studies examining the reasons why ministers have to leave office and how long they 
stay in the cabinet. 
 
This article fits into the second set of studies. In general, there is probably a multitude of 
factors at work whenever a minister’s time in government comes to an end. I assume these 
factors to be largely contingent on the minister him- or herself (e.g., ill health, or length of 
party membership) or on the political sphere in which he or she operates (e.g., parliamentary 
strength of the government party/parties). Both these individual and aggregate factors will be 
tested in the following analysis. This approach stands at least partly in contrast to present 
studies that maintain a strong focus on the prime minister’s capacities to hire and fire. Yet, 
with their record of coalition governments, the minister-president’s autonomy to reshuffle 
cabinets or to demote individual ministers is much weaker in the German Länder than it is, for 
example, in Great Britain or Australia—two countries often discussed in the ministerial 
turnover literature.3 Thus, the context of coalition governments is one of the aspects that must 
be taken into account when analyzing ministerial turnover in the German Länder. At the same 
time, the principal-agent relationship between the prime minister and his or her ministers, 
which is decisive for Westminster systems, should play a smaller role in the German context. 
Thus, its focus on individual ministers also separates this study from other works that 
approach ministerial turnover from a prime minister’s perspective and ask under which 
conditions and for what reasons heads of government reshuffle their cabinets, demote or 
promote ministers, and induce individual ministers’ resignations.4 
     More generally, this study also adds to the existing literature on political elites in 
Germany. Apart from sociological works following the seminal book by Dietrich Herzog, 
who gave questionnaires to a more or less representative sample of top politicians concerning 
their paths to power,5 the majority of studies on selection and de-selection processes for 
German political elites has focused predominantly on parliamentarians6 and federal ministers7 
or career patterns connecting both.8 The subnational level is often only analyzed as a 
recruiting pool for positions at the federal level.9 Notable exceptions include a book by Lars 
Vogel10 describing the recruitment of federal as well as Länder ministers and a study by Jens 
Borchert and Klaus Stolz. They argue that the Länder level—at least for members of the state 
legislatures—is a desirable goal in its own right in terms of job security, a professionalized 
working environment, and even status. Movement “up the ladder” towards a higher level 
(federal, EU), on the other hand, is often supported weakly by the own party. Also, many state 
legislators consider it risky and not worthwhile in the light of a cost-benefit-analysis.11  
     Focusing again on the concrete topic of this article—ministerial turnover and the 
respective duration in office—there is undoubtedly a much more comprehensive literature on 
ministerial selection, its institutional background, theoretical arguments, and the empirical 
mechanisms having an impact on it.12 Although there are at least some studies looking into 
ministerial tenure at the national level13—also in non Western democracies14—the 
subnational level has just recently started to attract more scholarly attention in this regard.  
     The existing studies nevertheless show that shifting the focus from the national to 
subnational levels should not only be regarded as a means to increase the number of cases and 
thus to find more robust results when it comes to the general patterns of ministerial turnover. 
They also show that analyses of political elites on the subnational level are an important 
building block for the understanding of more complex multilevel career patterns.15 For the 
Länder level in Germany, scholars have shown that characteristics of the political and 
institutional setting determine an individual minister's hazard for leaving the cabinet to a great 
deal while biographical characteristics in general only play a minor role for a minister's 
duration in office or their portfolio duration.16 These results, however, must be interpreted 
with caution as they are based on pooled survival models and do not distinguish between the 
different types of competing terminal events. Because of this fact, the effects of certain 
variables may well be underestimated. 
     The separate analysis of different types of terminal events using a competing risks 
approach, as it is well known from the literature on government survival,17 has until now only 
been applied once to the question of ministerial tenure. Matthew Kerby distinguishes between 
voluntary and involuntary exits for his sample of Canadian provincial ministers.18 Since this 
procedure has proven its worth in the Canadian context I follow it here, adding one further 
type of terminal event that is particularly relevant in coalition governments: collective exits. 
The methods section below explains in more detail the concrete statistical realization of the 





In this section, I first distinguish between twelve specific instances of terminal events that can 
end a ministerial tenure—and do—as they can be found empirically in the German Länder 
governments—and categorize them according to four broad types of terminal events. For the 
first three types, which are of conceptual interest for scholars of ministerial turnover, I present 
specific hypotheses concerning the factors that could explain their occurrence. The last part of 
this section gives an overview of the control variables that will be used in the subsequent 
statistical analysis. 
 
Twelve Ways to Drop Out of a Cabinet 
 
I presume ministers leave their position in cabinet either voluntarily, because they were forced 
out of office, because their whole party left the government and the minister had to leave as 
well—cling together, swing together—or, finally, because of bad fortune. Table 1 lists the 
specific terminal events that can be grouped into these four broad types. The categories for the 
classification of the terminal events are used in a mutually exclusive manner, although in the 
reality of research it goes without saying that such a classification scheme is never 
unambiguous. For example, it is extremely difficult to determine whether ministers leave 
office because of ill health and are thus forced to drop out of their cabinet position by bad 
fortune—as the following classification scheme supposes—or if they only put their health 
forward as a pretext while in reality political pressure forced them out of office. Additionally, 
we often face an accumulation of different reasons resulting in the exit of a minister.19 In each 
case I used a number of different sources (newspaper articles, CVs) to determine the most 
likely/most relevant reason for the ministerial termination.20  
 
Table 1: Types of Terminal Events 
Voluntary exits Forced exits Collective exits Bad fortune and technical exits 
• Change into 
private business 
• Change into 




• Partial ministerial 
reshuffle after 
elections 
• Conflicts within 
the own party 
• Other terminal 
event (politically 
induced) 
• Voting out of 
government 
• Lost vote of no 
confidence against 
prime minister 
• Conflicts between 
the coalition parties 
• Ill health / old 
age 
• Death 




     I assume that in general all ministers try to maximize their time in office and do not leave 
the cabinet without having either a good reason or a real necessity for doing so. This basic 
idea is echoed in my definition of voluntary exits, including only those ministers who leave 
for a lucrative job in the private sector, or a higher-ranking political position. Such a position 
may be in another Länder cabinet or—in accordance with the classic springboard argument—
at the federal level.21 Other exits that are sometimes termed “voluntary” by the media do not 
actually fall in the category of voluntary exits. Good examples are retirements. I assume that 
no minister retires voluntarily but that these exits are actually either politically induced or due 
to health reasons (see below).  
     The second category consists of forced exits (column 2 in Table 1). I regard forced exits as 
terminal events that are politically induced, which means that the force that pushes a minister 
out of office has to originate in the political sphere. Three main forms can be distinguished. 
First, scandals are all types of exits in whose case the media, the political opponent, the own 
coalition members and/or the public put so much pressure on the minister that he or she has to 
leave the cabinet. Second, especially after elections, minister presidents have the chance to 
shuffle around the cabinet members according to their will. These periods are windows of 
opportunity to get rid of unpopular or inept ministers. Inner party as well as coalition 
pressures, however, may restrict the prime minister’s capacity to hire and fire. Third, 
ministers can get into serious political trouble if they lose the confidence of their party, e.g., if 
they position themselves in opposition to the majority view in their party. The fourth form of 
exits in this category are those terminal events for which it is not possible to determine the 
exact reason, but for which a political (noncollective exit) reason is highly likely.  
     The third category consists of collective exits (column 3 in Table 1). Ministers that leave 
the cabinet due to a collective exit leave government because their party is voted out of office, 
they exit together with a prime minister after a lost vote of no confidence or they leave their 
office because their whole parliamentary group withdraws from government after conflicts 
with the other coalition member(s).  
     The fourth category of terminal events includes exit types that are neither politically 
induced (as forced or collective exits) nor volitional acts of the ministers themselves (column 
4 in Table 1). On the one hand, these are instances in which the observation period comes to 
an end before the minister has left the cabinet. I call this type technical exit. On the other 
hand, there are those cases in which bad fortune terminates a minister’s career. It is just as 
Machiavelli observed: as the torrential river that fortuna turns into from time to time, she 
sweeps away everything without the affected individuals being able to resist. Exits due to ill 
health, old age, or death are examples for this kind of terminal event. Bad fortune and 
technical exits are always censored in the statistical analysis (see section 5). For the other 





In which cases do ministers voluntarily step down? The first hypothesis is connected to 
seniority in high-level politics:  
H1: Ministers with much seniority in high-level politics should be more likely to leave 
the cabinet voluntarily.22 
 
Other things being equal, ministers who have been in high-level politics for a long period of 
time can be regarded as having more experience and/or a better network within the political 
sphere than their younger colleagues. While the first point may be more of an argument for a 
change into a higher position within politics, the second point is probably relevant for private 
businesses wishing to exploit the contacts of former ministers.  
     The second hypothesis regarding voluntary exits is connected to the salience of a ministry: 
H2: Ministers heading important portfolios should have a greater hazard to step down 
voluntarily. 
 
In important portfolios, ministers should have better options to present themselves and 
thereby to advance their own careers. Hence, these politicians should get more interesting job 
offers from businesses outside the political sphere, as well as for other state or political 
positions. Although the importance of a ministry is also a function of the parties’ ideology—
Greens will most likely assign more weight to the environmental portfolio, whereas Social 
Democrats might deem the ministries of labor and social welfare more important—we can, 
with respect to the specific Länder competencies, nevertheless identify a certain core of 
ministries that are of specific significance for all governments. These are the ministries of 
finance, education and cultural affairs, economic affairs, and the interior. For ministers 
heading these portfolios, we therefore expect higher hazards for voluntary exits.23 
      The third and final hypothesis on voluntary exits focuses on the parliamentary safety 
net:24  
H3: Ministers who simultaneously with their cabinet positions are also members of the 
Länder parliament should have a lower hazard to leave the cabinet voluntarily. 
 
Membership in the parliament may be seen as a fallback option for ministers. Politicians who 
are aware of this option may be less ambitious in pursuing other career paths towards higher 




With regard to the forced exits, the principal-agent logic becomes relevant. In theory, the 
minister-presidents in the German Länder are able to decide about the composition of their 
cabinet on their own. Yet, in reality, coalition agreements often hinder prime ministers from 
implementing their preferred staffing choices. Therefore, the type of government is crucial for 
the minister-president’s latitude to hire and especially to fire ministers. Distinguishing 
between single-party majority and coalition governments is a first step in order to check this 
assumption. Regarding the latter kind of government, however, it makes sense to further 
discriminate between ministers from the same party as the minister-president, on the one 
hand, and those from the other coalition parties, on the other.    
H4: Ministers serving in single-party majority governments (SPG) or in coalition 
governments with the minister president from the same party as the minister should 
have a higher hazard to be forced out of cabinet than their colleagues in coalition 
governments who are not a member in the minister president’s party.  
 
Additionally, seniority as a proxy for political experience should help ministers to survive 
from forced exits in cabinet: 





The category of collective exits contains first and foremost those ministers whose party was 
voted out of office. There are only a few instances in which a whole party left the cabinet 
during an interelection period instead of after elections. The first hypothesis is therefore also 
connected to the type of government. Parties forming SPGs should have higher chances of 
being successful at future elections and this should reduce the hazard for collective exits. It is 
unlikely that a party that holds the majority and rules alone drops out of government all at 
once. Taken these arguments together we can formulate the following hypothesis:   
H6: In SPGs, the hazard for collective exits should be lower than in non SPGs. 
     
A similar argument can be made for coalition governments: the party supplying the minister 
president in a coalition should in general have better chances to also be part of the next 
government than the smaller coalition partner(s). Besides that, it would not make much sense 
for a party leading a coalition to exit its own government.  
H7: In a coalition government, we expect a lower hazard for collective exits for 
ministers who are members of the minister president’s party. 
 
A study on ministerial tenure in Great Britain, shows that majority size does not influence 
ministerial turnover. This is plausible for Westminster systems where SPGs are the rule.25 In 
coalition governments, the usual occurrence in the German Länder, it seems nevertheless 
reasonable to expect majority size to have an effect—at least on collective exits. Yet, both 
directions of influence are imaginable: on the one hand, parties within coalitions relying on 
large majorities may not consider themselves as dependent on their respective coalition 
partners. This could reduce cabinet duration. On the other hand, being part of a coalition 
relying on a strong majority makes it less likely that one of the coalition partners will be voted 
out of government at the next elections. I assume the latter effect to be stronger: 
H8: Ministers from governments relying on a large majority are expected to show 






Earlier studies on ministerial turnover have shown that there are a number of other variables 
that should be controlled for.26 When taking these control variables into consideration 
together with the above mentioned explanatory factors, all independent variables can be 
divided into two groups. First are individual factors describing biographical characteristics of 
the respective minister; and, second are factors on the aggregate level, i.e. attributes of the 
institutional and political setting that determine the political arena in which the ministers act. 
Table 2 lists all independent variables. 
 
  
Table 2: Independent Variables 






s • Seniority (H1, H5) 
• Important ministry (H2) 
• Parliamentary safety net (H3) 
• Type of government—SPG & coalition 
government with minister from the party as 
prime minister (H4, H6, H7) 
• Majority—percentage of parliamentary seats 







• Regional rootedness—birthplace 
in the same Bundesland as the 
ministerial job 
• Expert minister 
• Education (tertiary education, 
PhD, Habilitation) 
• Length of party membership 
• Number of different cabinet 
positions (portfolios) during the 
ministerial spell  
• Number of spells the minister has 
served before the observed spell 
• Prime minister 
• Minority cabinet 
• Length of constitutional inter-election period 
(CIEP) 
• Possibility to launch a vote of no confidence 






The original dataset compiled for this analysis consists of 768 ministerial spells in total. Table 
3 gives an overview and classifies them by Bundesland and type of terminal event. All 
ministers who held a position within one of the sixteen German Länder cabinets between 1 
January 1991 and 31 December 2010 were included with their complete duration in 
government. As a result, none of the data are left-censored; instead, all ministers’ durations 
were coded from the very first day in office onwards, even if this date was before 1 January 
1991. For example, former Bavarian Minister-President Max Streibl started his cabinet career 
in 1970 as Minister of Agriculture and Ecology. In 1977, he transferred to the Office of the 
Minister of Finance and in 1988 he took the office of the prime minister after the early death 
of Franz Josef Strauß. The ministerial spell recorded for Max Streibl therefore lasts from 1970 
to 1992, when Edmund Stoiber succeeded him as Bavarian minister-president. Minister-
presidents are included in the dataset although they are obviously in a lot of respects more 
than just a primus inter pares within government.27 To account for their prominent position, I 
control for minister-president status. Ministerial spells interrupted by a period of time in 
which the minister was not part of the government are counted as separate durations. 
Nevertheless, the analysis controls for the amount of experience a minister has gained during 
earlier positions within government. 
     The boxplots in Figure 1 present the durations in cabinet according to the different 
terminal events. Looking at the median durations we find that especially those ministers who 
drop out of cabinet voluntarily are the ones with the longest overall cabinet durations, while 
ministers that were forced out of office or had to leave office due to a collective exit show 
considerably shorter tenures. 
 
Table 3: Terminal events by Bundesland 
 
BE=Berlin; BR-Brandenburg; BW=Baden-Württemberg; BY=Bavaria; HB=Bremen; HE=Hesse; HH=Hamburg; 
MV=Mecklenburg-West Pomerania; NI=Lower Saxony; NRW=North Rhine-Westphalia; RP=Rhineland 
Palatinate; SH=Schleswig-Holstein; SL=Saarland; SN=Saxony; ST=Saxony-Anhalt; TH-Thuringia 
 
  
 Terminal event BE BR BW BY HB HE HH MV NI NRW RP SH SL SN ST TH Sum 
Voluntary Exits Change into private 
business 
7 9 5 1 3 4 3 2 7 6 5 3 5 5 3 5 73 
Change into other state / 
political position 
8 2 7 4 5 5 5  1 3 2 8   1 3 54 
Forced Exits Scandal 3 7 5 7 3 6 8 2 3 5 1 2 1 6 8 4 71 
Partial ministerial 
reshuffle after elections 
8 1 7 1 8 1 9 5  5 2 3 7 2 2 4 65 
Conflicts within the 
own party 
1 1 2 6 1  1 5    4 2 1 1 1 26 
Other terminal event 
(politically induced) 
9 8 4 9 4 8 6 3 8 2 3 6 4 19 6 13 112 
Collective Exits Voting out of 
government 
4 6 4  6 20 20 10 24 23 10 2 8 2 22 8 169 
Lost vote of no 
confidence against pm 
5           1     6 
Conflicts between the 
coalition parties 
3    1  3     4     11 
Bad fortune & 
technical exits 
Ill health / old age  2 2 1 3 1  4 3 3 3 3 1  2 1 29 
Death     1            1 
End of observation 
period 
9 9 12 12 7 11 6 9 9 12 8 8 9 10 10 10 151 
 Sum 57 45 48 41 42 56 61 40 55 59 34 44 37 45 55 49 768 
Figure 1: Overall Duration in Cabinet by Type of Exit 
 
 
Competing Risks Cox Model 
 
I use the semiparametric Cox model as it allows estimating coefficients and hazard ratios 
without the necessity to assume a certain baseline function as fully parametrized models do.28 
Regardless of whether we assume that there is a real and direct dependency between elapsed 
time and the baseline hazard or whether we expect the time dependency to be just an artifact 
of unobserved heterogeneity in the data—which by definition always comes along with a 
negative time dependency29—for estimating a completely parametrized model, the functional 
form of the baseline hazard has to be specified correctly. After all, a theoretically grounded 
derivation of the baseline hazard is impossible if time dependency is due to unobserved 
heterogeneity and it is still extremely difficult in cases of real time dependency. Nevertheless, 
resorting to the observation of empirical survival or hazard functions cannot be seen as a real 
solution either as it only approximates the baseline hazard function while the effects of all 
explanatory variables are still included in this pooled hazard function—whether this function 
comes close to the baseline hazard depends on the question to what extent the covariates 
correlate with time at risk.30 
     The Cox model is a convenient way to circumvent the problems of fully parametric 
approaches. It assumes that there is a certain time dependency, but we do not have to specify 
any particular functional form of this baseline hazard. Therefore, we need fewer basic 
assumptions when estimating the model—assumptions that could always be wrong and result 
in biased estimates. The hazard rate gives the instantaneous risk that a minister drops out of 
office at time t—given he or she has not dropped out before. In a Cox model, there is no 
explicit constant β0 that would describe the baseline hazard in a parametrized model. But, 
even without knowing the concrete form of the baseline hazard we can estimate the β-
coefficients as long as we assume the hazard ratios to be proportional. We therefore test 
whether every covariate has a “proportional and constant effect that is invariant to when in the 
process the value of the covariate changes.”31 David Cox developed the so called partial 
likelihood (PL) method, which is not based on the exact survival times, but rather on their rank 
order. In a similar way as in MLE (maximum likelihood estimation) the logarithm of the PL is 
maximized for obtaining the β-coefficients.  
     A dummy variable distinguishes between events of interest and censored durations. In 
general, we censor cases if we cannot observe their full event history, either because the 
starting point is before the beginning of the observation period (left censoring) or because our 
subject is still in the risk set, i.e., he or she has not experienced the event of interest until the 
end of the observation period (right censoring). For all censored cases we assume that they 
would have lasted longer if their event history were not artificially shortened. For this reason, 
we also right censor cases in which the terminal event was clearly no event of interest. In 
addition to the end of the observation period, exits due to ill health, old age, or death are also 
treated as right censored, because we expect that ministers experiencing these types of 
terminal events would have stayed in office longer if they had not been swept away by the 
raging river of bad fortune. In event history, censoring does not mean to drop a case 
completely from the dataset, but to use the available information from uncensored cases that 
have finished an unmitigated event history to estimate how long a censored case would have 
lasted if it had not been terminated early. As we do not have a fixed starting point of our 
observation period but observe all ministers that had been in office from 1 January 1991 
onwards with their real starting point of their ministerial duration, we do not have any left 
censored cases.  
     Censoring is also the key concept for the estimation of competing risks models. For every 
one of the three types of terminal events, I estimate a separate proportional hazard model with 
all cases terminating due to a terminal event other than the specific one of interest being 
censored. For example, the hazard rate of the forced exits is estimated treating collective exits 
as well as voluntary exits in the exact same way as cases terminating as technical or bad 
fortune exits—they are all censored. Three basic requirements have to be met for the 
estimation:32  
(1) The competing events must be mutually exclusive, i.e., every case can only experience 
one of the three types of terminal events.  
 
(2) Every subject in the population must have a non zero probability to terminate because 
of each of the three types of events. 
 
(3) The occurrence of one of the competing events must not affect the hazard rate of 
experiencing another event. 
  
All three preconditions are fulfilled in our study as every minister could, at least theoretically, 
drop out of cabinet because of each of the three types of terminal events. Additionally, each of 
the events is definitely terminal which means that no minister can experience more than one 
of these events at a time.33  
  


















SPG 1.114  2.356*** 2.504*** 0.471* 0.494* 
 (0.354)  (0.497) (0.520) (0.183) (0.187) 
SPG * time     0.999*** 0.999*** 
     (0.000183) (0.000175) 
Coalition & same party as PM 1.987** 1.720*** 1.881*** 1.918*** 0.496*** 0.479*** 
 (0.567) (0.312) (0.370) (0.369) (0.0929) (0.0853) 
Minority cabinet 1.214  0.873  1.107  
 (0.625)  (0.281)  (0.362)  
Parliamentary strength of gov. parties (in %) 1.002  1.010 1.012 0.972*** 0.970*** 
 (0.0115)  (0.00815) (0.00753) (0.00969) (0.00874) 
Parliamentary safety net 0.879  1.010  1.150  
 (0.178)  (0.144)  (0.195)  
Seniority (in years) 0.999  0.987 0.984* 0.990  
 (0.0155)  (0.0107) (0.00875) (0.0129)  
Important ministry 1.365 1.503** 0.838  1.312 1.282 
 (0.285) (0.277) (0.111)  (0.221) (0.204) 
CIEP (in years) 0.986  0.682** 0.678*** 0.483*** 0.450*** 
 (0.253)  (0.104) (0.0973) (0.0852) (0.0742) 
Individual vote of no confidence possible (0/1) 1.165  0.944  0.815  
 (0.238)  (0.138)  (0.158)  
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male) 1.106  1.127  1.012  
 (0.250)  (0.171)  (0.182)  
Tertiary education 1.547  1.007  1.344  
 (0.564)  (0.216)  (0.398)  
PhD 0.954  1.128  0.904  
 (0.205)  (0.161)  (0.166)  
Habilitation 0.759  0.758  0.601 0.582* 
 (0.283)  (0.194)  (0.202) (0.176) 
Regional rootedness 0.758 0.716* 0.864  1.147  
 (0.148) (0.131) (0.115)  (0.181)  
Party membership (in years) 0.995  1.000  0.995  
 (0.00946)  (0.00624)  (0.00790)  
Expert ministers 1.161  1.133  0.821  
 (0.373)  (0.240)  (0.268)  
Number of cabinet spells before 0.667  0.957  0.615 0.552 
 (0.326)  (0.300)  (0.289) (0.253) 
Number of portfolios during spell 0.107*** 0.0995*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.146*** 0.190*** 
 (0.0386) (0.0348) (0.0252) (0.0249) (0.0406) (0.0283) 
Number of portfolios * time 1.000** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000  
 (0.000112) (0.000107) (6.92e-05) (6.80e-05) (0.000107)  
Prime minister 0.823  0.532** 0.595* 1.810* 1.915** 
 (0.326)  (0.165) (0.177) (0.561) (0.563) 
N_total / N_fail 768 / 127 768 / 127 768 / 274 768 / 274 768 / 186 768 /186 













Hazard ratios with standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Stepwise backward selection models: 
removing p >= 0.20. Prime ministers included. Interactions with survival time included when the Grambsch-Therneau test 
indicates significant non-proportionality. 
 
Findings from the Statistical Analysis 
 
The results of the Cox models are presented in form of hazard ratios in Table 4. A hazard ratio 
of one indicates no influence of the independent variable on the hazard. Values greater than 
one show an increase in the hazard, those lower than one indicate a decrease. For example, a 
hazard ratio of 1.5 means that an increase of the independent variable of one point raises the 
hazard for turnover under ceteris paribus conditions by 50 percent. For each competing 
events category there are two models. The first one is a full model with all variables included 
simultaneously; the second one applies a stepwise backward selection mechanism to obtain a 
more parsimonious model. All in all, the results are stable when comparing the full and the 
stepwise-reduced models.  
     With respect to the main argument—that one and the same variable can have very different 
effects on cabinet duration according to the type of terminal event—I find all but two of my 
hypotheses supported. Ministers heading important portfolios are more likely to drop out of 
cabinet voluntarily (H2). If the minister is a member of a coalition government and at the 
same time a fellow member of the minister-president’s party, this increases his or her hazard 
to be forced out of office significantly, but not as strong as in cases where the minister is part 
of a SPG (H4). As expected, for the collective exits this pattern is reversed: ministers serving 
in SPG and in coalitions with the minister belonging to the minister-president’s party show 
significantly lower hazard ratios (H6 and H7). Hypothesis H8 is also affirmed: the models 
show that parliamentary strength of the government parties is only relevant for collective 
exits. Ministers working in governments that can rely on a large majority in parliament have 
lower hazards for exiting the cabinet collectively with their party colleagues. There is, 
however, no impact on the hazards for voluntary or forced exits. Seniority in high-level 
politics, i.e., being at least a member of a Länder parliament, is another factor that impacts 
ministerial duration. Yet, a greater seniority only reduces the hazard of being forced out of 
government as expected in H5, but there is no influence on voluntary exits as it was expected 
in H1. The other hypothesis with little support is H3: having a parliamentary safety net has no 
impact on the occurrence of voluntary exits—in fact, it does not significantly influence 
ministerial duration in any of the models.       
     In addition to the tested hypotheses, some of the control variables show significant effects. 
For example, the number of different portfolios a minister has already held during his/her 
cabinet spell is negatively related to the hazard for all three types of terminal events. As 
expected, the dummy for minister-president shows a considerable effect as well. On the one 
hand, prime ministers are less prone to forced exits—which makes perfect sense from a 
principal-agent perspective. On the other hand, minister-president status increases the hazard 
for collectively exiting the cabinet. This is plausible, too, as in most cases minister-presidents 
are in such an unchallenged position that they only have to be afraid of being voted out of 
office. Another significant control is the length of the constitutional interelection period 
(CIEP).34 A longer CIEP decreases the hazard for collective and forced exits. For collective 
exits, this comes as no surprise as this type of terminal event consists mostly of ministers who 
had to leave office because their party was voted out of government. A higher frequency of 
elections in Länder with shorter CIEPs, therefore, automatically increases the hazard for 
collective exits. Yet, a long CIEP also seems to stabilize governments with regard to forced 
exits. This is the case because minister-presidents reshuffle their cabinet more often in the 
direct follow up to a re-election than in the middle of a legislative period. Most of the other 
control variables do not affect the hazard rate in any way. This result was not completely 
unexpected, as a number of studies have shown that especially biographical characteristics of 
the ministers do not very much influence the probability to drop out of office. Taken as a 
whole we could say, that for those politicians who make it into the cabinet—and for this 
journey they clearly need specific biographic characteristics—these individual factors do not 
play a big role in determining their tenure in office any longer. At this stage, it is rather the 
aggregate parameters describing the political and institutional landscape that discernibly 
influence the individual hazards.  
     In order to assess the model fit of the Cox regressions, I inspect the extent to which the 
survival times estimated from the Cox model correlate with the real ones. For this purpose, I 
plot Cox-Snell residuals against the empirical cumulative hazard rate derived from a Kaplan-
Meier estimation.35 For a well fitting model, the Cox-Snell plot should only deviate slightly 
from a straight line with slope one—departures from this pattern in the right part of the plot 
can be tolerated seeing that they can be attributed to the effective sample size, which becomes 
smaller and smaller over time, leading to a more variable baseline hazard.36 Figure 2 shows 
the model fit for all three backward selection models. All three models show a good fit—
especially in the most relevant lower left side of the plots. The Cox models thus accurately 
accommodate the empirical data. 
 
Figure 2: Model Fit of Cox-Snell Residuals versus Cumulative Kaplan-Meier Hazard 
 
 
Conclusion: Different Paths Leading to a Long Time in Office 
 
In this article, I have shown that when it comes to ministerial turnover it does not only make 
sense to distinguish analytically between different types of terminal events from a theoretical 
point of view, but that such a distinction is a necessary precondition to analyze the factors 
influencing ministerial turnover and the durations in cabinet in a meaningful way. 
Differentiating among voluntary, forced, and collective exits (a minister has to leave the 
government because his or her whole party dropped out of government), as well as those exits 
that are neither volitional acts of the minister nor politically induced (e.g., end of observation 
period or death of the minister), I demonstrate that one and the same variable can have very 
different effects on the hazard depending on the type of terminal event. For example, 
ministers with much seniority are less likely to be forced out of office, while their time within 
the high political sphere does not impact on the hazards for voluntary or collective exits. 
Furthermore, ministers in SPGs and in those coalition governments in which the respective 
minister is a member of the minister-president’s party are much more likely to be forced out 
of cabinet. Here, the principal-agent logic becomes apparent. In these cases, minister 
presidents probably do not have many restrictions to push an improper or unpopular cabinet 
member out of office, whereas it is much tougher to get rid of a coalition partner’s minister. 
For collective exits, it is exactly the other way round: ministers who are from the same party 
as the prime minister—which is of course the rule in SPGs—exhibit a smaller hazard for 
collective exits than ministers who are not members of the minister-president’s party.  
     Generally speaking, empirical evidence gives support to the idea that variables can show 
very different effects depending on the type of terminal event. Factors that “help” a minister 
not having to leave the government due to a collective exit can, on the other hand, increase the 
hazard of being forced out of office. From a methodological point of view, this article has 
shown that in order to gain a better understanding of the complex processes that govern 
turnover mechanism within cabinets, competing events approaches must become an inevitable 
component of our studies. In contrast, pooled models, which do not distinguish between the 
different types of competing terminal events, will never be able to identify the relevant 
independent variables and their effects, especially if these effects cancel each other out, such 
as in the case of an SPG. As seen before, ministers in SPGs exhibit a much higher hazard to be 
forced out of office while, at the same time, collective exits are much more uncommon within 
this group of cabinet members. A pooled model would hardly find any effect for SPGs.  
     Regarding biographical factors such as gender, education, or regional background, the Cox 
models confirm earlier studies that have also not found much effect for this group of 
variables. We can therefore conclude that for those politicians who make it into the cabinet, 
individual factors do not play a big role in determining their tenure in office. At the Länder 
cabinet stage of their careers, it rather seems that the factors describing the political and 
institutional landscape have a much stronger influence on the individual hazards. Yet, if asked 
what a minister should do in order to remain in cabinet for a long period of time, the 
foregoing analysis can at least give some hints. First, to prevent being forced out of 
government, ministers should start to accumulate experience at high-level politics early in 
their political career, e.g., as a member of a Landtag or the Bundestag. Interestingly, it is only 
this seniority in high-level politics that helps an individual to remain in office—but not 
necessarily length of party membership. Second, ministers should strive for important 
portfolios, i.e., portfolios in which the Land level has substantive powers, such as finance or 
education. These “important” ministers are not only less likely to be forced out of office, but 
they also leave their cabinet position voluntarily more often in order to either start new 
lucrative and prestigious jobs in private business or to get promoted to even higher political 
positions, e.g., as a minister in the federal government.  
     This article should be seen as one step towards a more holistic understanding of the 
complex dynamics determining the careers of German Länder ministers. Building on its 
findings, there are several possible avenues for future research. At this point, I would like to 
briefly sketch out two of them. One obvious question would be to ask whether the results 
found in this study also hold in other parliamentary contexts, or whether the characteristics of 
the German case—particularly the federal structure providing distinct career options that are 
not available in a more centralized state—largely make it a very special case. Another related 
follow-up question concerns a minister’s career steps after leaving office. This question is 
particularly interesting with regard to the concept of multilevel careers, which is being 
discussed intensively in the political elites literature at the moment.37 Again, as in the present 
article, it probably makes sense to distinguish between different types of exits when analyzing 
such post ministerial careers, asking questions like: where do ministers end up who were 
forced out of government due to scandals? Do they get a second chance? What are the next 
career steps of those who leave voluntarily or who had to leave because their party was voted 
out of government? And, is being a Länder minister just a staging post on the road to a more 
prestigious political position and, thus, a stepping-stone that helps to achieve ambitious 
political plans? Or is it more of a dead end for any career in German politics? For all these 
questions that focus on understanding complete careers of politicians, the present study 
already holds valuable insights because it explains why some ministers succeed in staying in 
cabinet for decades while others have to leave office after only a few months in the cabinet. 
Most certainly, further research in that regard is crucially needed. To this end, it is also 
necessary to overcome the political elite studies’ tradition of focusing on single transitions 
only—such as the transition from being a minister to not being a minister any longer that was 
analyzed in this study. Instead, painting a holistic picture of complete careers, for example, by 
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